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INTRODUCTION
Faced with chronic budget deficits, growing entitlements, and an aging workforce, the
US Federal Government and many of its allies are searching for savings by outsourcing
both positions and products. This presents senior defense officials with a dual
challenge: first, what should the Department of Defense (DoD) make and what should
it buy in the marketplace?1 Second, if the decision is to buy (or outsource), how can we
ensure a better outcome for both taxpayers and the military?
To help answer these two questions, this article borrows from a relatively new field in
economics called Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). We offer a summary and
synthesis of TCE, some useful principles for formulating acquisition strategy, and
implications for defense procurement and acquisition management in the US Depart-
ment of Defense.
According to Federal Acquisition Regulations the term “acquisition” refers to
acquiring supplies or services (including construction) by contract with appropriated
funds by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease.2
Defense acquisition extends from the development and procurement of equipment
(materiel), to purchasing services and support for military forces.3 As a matter of policy,
the US DoD buys (outsources) much of what is labeled “acquisition”. This article
* We are grateful to the editors of this journal, participants at the RAND sessions of the Western
Economic Association meetings, and colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School for many
helpful comments and suggestions. We would specifically like to thank our colleagues Dr Keith
Snyder, John Dillard and Admiral James Greene of the Graduate School of Business and Public
Policy for research sponsorship and for organizing a yearly Acquisition Research Symposium
where we were invited to present this work. The usual disclaimers apply.
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distills fundamental principles of TCE to improve the defense investment decisions and
acquisition management practices that ultimately impact on a nation’s future security.
TCE involves the study of the “vertical” boundaries of business enterprises – defined
primarily by what goods and services are produced within the firm (“make”) and which
are acquired from the market (“buy” or “outsource”). Among the pioneers of this liter-
ature are Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase, and Oliver Williamson. TCE is also a
major feature in a movement called the “New Institutional Economics”. However,
these literatures focus almost exclusively on the private sector.
More recent works by Masten, Meehan and Snyder; Melese, Franck, Angelis and
Dillard; Pint and Baldwin; Williamson; Menard and Saussier; Franck and Melese; and
Dillard, Franck and Melese have begun to study TCE in a government setting.4 Recent
work by Franck and Melese examined the key document that guides all US federal
policy regarding the potential to compete commercial-like government activities (what
the British military call “market testing”).5
Circular A-76 issued by the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) governs
any so-called “competitive sourcing” (make-or-buy) competitions between a defense
activity and private sector suppliers. Applying TCE suggests that one size does not fit
all. Outsourcing relationships vary widely in their characteristics and potential difficul-
ties, yet OMB A-76 calls for an across-the-board (one-time) ten percent production
cost advantage to justify outsourcing. A key insight from TCE is that this can signifi-
cantly underestimate the production cost savings required to justify outsourcing. The
extra transaction costs required to govern the outsourcing relationship can more than
offset any production cost advantages from outsourcing. In this article we extend some
key observations of the TCE literature to defense acquisition. This is especially relevant
since our future security critically depends on the success of today’s investments.
The next section offers a brief summary and synthesis of the TCE literature as it
applies to defense acquisition. It explores the implications of certain incentive
contracts, hedged (or “tapered”) outsourcing, and various governance issues. It also
describes the principal components (or “life cycle”) of typical defense acquisition
transactions, including research and development (R&D) and the procurement of
weapon systems, and provides a summary and synthesis of current practices in US
defense acquisition management. Finally, we synthesize two bodies of knowledge – the
theory of TCE and current defense acquisition policy and guidance – and concludes by
exploring possibilities for new insights generated by TCE to improve defense acquisi-
tion decisions to ensure our future national security.
A SYNTHESIS OF TCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO DEFENSE
ACQUISITION
The standard case study in TCE is where ex-ante competitive bidding for a contract
leads to an ex-post bilateral monopoly relationship. A very real cost that is often over-
looked in many defense acquisitions is that the winning supplier can lock in the
government by making investments in productive assets that are specific to the
relationship (and that have little value outside that relationship). While initially advan-
tageous, these investments in specific assets can make it prohibitively costly for other
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companies to compete in subsequent re-bidding of the contract. As a result, defense
contracting relationships can involve extra transaction costs such as measurement,
monitoring, and re-negotiation costs that can quickly overwhelm an apparent produc-
tion cost advantage (mandated to be at least ten percent to justify outsourcing under
OMB A-76).
The lesson is that transaction cost considerations need to be added to the current
exclusive focus on production costs in regulations like OMB A-76. This also suggests
that more attention be granted to: the Statement of Work (for goods) or Performance
Work Statement (for services); the strategic bundling (or unbundling) of goods and
services; the clear definition of terms of the contract – including appropriate incentives;
an understanding of the complete costs of the transaction; and the careful design of gov-
ernance mechanisms to maximize potential benefits from the outsourcing relationship.
These insights can help improve current defense acquisition management practices.
THE “MAKE-OR-BUY” DECISION
The “make-or-buy” decision is one that faces every military. The question involves how
much national security to “produce” in-house (make), and how much to “purchase”
through the market (buy). The field of TCE offers an attractive theoretical foundation
for business “make-or-buy” decisions.6 “Make-or-buy” decisions ultimately define the
boundaries of a business. Although primarily focused on the private sector, the TCE lit-
erature has occasionally been applied in a government setting.7
The dual objective of this section is to synthesize key principles and insights of TCE,
and to apply those insights to support the “make-or-buy” decisions facing senior lead-
ership in the US DoD and in other countries. These “make-or-buy” decisions
ultimately define the public boundaries of defense departments. In the course of this
investigation new tools and insights are revealed that can serve program managers who
oversee major weapon systems as well as others in the acquisition community. The
ultimate goal is to leverage TCE to improve “make-or-buy” decisions, and ensure
better defense contracting outcomes in terms of performance, cost and schedules.
Production and transaction costs
Coase was the first economist to ask why some profit-maximizing firms produce goods
and services themselves at higher production costs than can be purchased in the mar-
ketplace.8 The answer is that going to market entails “transaction costs”, and that these
search, information, decision, contracting, measurement, monitoring, incentive and
enforcement costs can more than offset production cost advantages from outsourcing.9
TCE views organizations as a complex web of contractual relationships among
resource owners. Each relationship – the acquisition of an input, employment of a
worker, transfer of a product or service from a supplier to a customer – is a transaction.
In TCE, the transaction is the basic unit of analysis. The primary insight of TCE is that
the choice of optimal governance mechanism (contracts, organizations, incentives, etc.)
depends on key characteristics of the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty, com-
plexity, and frequency – each of which are defined in this study).
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In business, two costs typically drive a defense firm’s “make-or-buy” decision:
production costs, and the costs of managing transactions or “transaction costs”.
Conventional economic analysis focuses on production costs (input costs, competition,
learning curves, economies of scale and scope, etc.). The new field of TCE emphasizes
transaction costs (search and information costs, decision and contracting costs, mon-
itoring and enforcement costs, etc.).
One of the most critical contributions of TCE is to focus on the non-trivial costs of
managing and co-ordinating transactions. For example, this is the exclusive role of
DoD’s Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). This $1.1 billion organiza-
tion is made up of 10,500 civilians and 600 military, whose sole responsibility is to help
manage and co-ordinate some 300,000 defense contracts valued at nearly $950
billion.10
For a given product or service, the decision of whether to “make or buy” involves
minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs. According to TCE the dual
focus of any outsourcing evaluation should be: (a) to sort transactions into categories
based upon certain key characteristics, and (b) to evaluate the costs and consequences
of alternative contracts, organizational structures and mechanisms available to govern
those transactions. Strategic contracting tools and other governance mechanisms can
be applied to lower transaction costs. The lower the transaction costs of outsourcing,
the smaller production cost savings need to be to support the decision to outsource.
The challenges of co-ordination and motivation
Two key components of the “make-or-buy” decision are highlighted in TCE:
co-ordination and motivation. The issue of co-ordination arises from the economic
opportunity for specialization and exchange. Organizations tend to specialize in “core”
activities in which they have a comparative advantage, and engage in transactions (or
outsource) to acquire other resources (e.g. contract labor), intermediate goods
(material supplies, equipment, platforms, etc.), or services (IT, building maintenance,
etc.). Transactions between government and the defense industry can generate sub-
stantial gains for both parties. In DoD, the gains from specialization and exchange
(outsourcing) are expected to take the form of more and better products, delivered
more quickly, and with fewer resources (i.e. performance, schedule, and cost).
TCE recognizes these potential gains, but also acknowledges the dark side of defense
and other transactions – motivation. TCE predicts that parties involved in a transaction
can benefit from co-operative agreements, but they are assumed to be self-interested,
and to have conflicting objectives (e.g., DoD – maximizes effectiveness subject to a
budget constraint; defense industry – maximizes profits). As a consequence, parties in
a transaction will not always have the motivation to follow through on agreements – par-
ticularly when specific assets/investments are involved, and information is imperfect
(incomplete and uncertain) or asymmetric (one party has an information advantage
over the other). The ultimate outcome depends on specific characteristics of the trans-
action and on the incentive structures that govern the parties involved.11
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LIMITS TO GOVERNMENT AS AN ENTERPRISE
Concepts of TCE are also relevant within government organizations like the DoD. If
the transaction costs of maintaining a business relationship between the DoD and a
defense contractor overwhelm the production cost advantages, then Coase in his
seminal article argues “the operation of the market costs something and by forming an
organization and allowing some authority to direct resources, certain [transaction]
costs are saved”.12 But the cure – integrating transactions inside the government – can
be worse than the disease. When price and contract mechanisms are supplanted by
internal co-ordination, this entails risks of weak incentives, sub-optimization, internal
opportunistic behavior, and multi-tasking, as well as internal bureaucratic costs of
co-ordinating, monitoring and improving the cost and quality of publicly-produced
defense goods and services.
In TCE, the successful resolution of resource allocation problems rests on designing
mechanisms (incentives, organizations, markets, contracts, etc.) that allow opportunis-
tic individuals with conflicting objectives to overcome their collective action problems
in pursuit of mutual gains.13 In the case of government outsourcing, TCE assumes that
government “principals” and industry “agents” each behave according to their con-
flicting interests. For example, consider the conflicting objectives and incentives that
face major players in defense acquisition.
The recently released Kadish report raises serious concerns about the ability of the
US Defense Acquisition System to “develop and deliver required capabilities when
needed and at predictable [production] costs”.14 The authors point to three key chal-
lenges:
1. “Requirements developers mandate systems that are technologically unrealistic or
unable to be delivered within the ‘time-to-need’ that is desired by Combatant Com-
manders”;
2. “Program management teams allow requirements to escalate without discipline,
driving costs beyond baseline budget and schedule”; and
3. “Those who hold the budget purse strings in DoD . . . reduce annual program
budgets to fit within the ‘top-line’ of the President’s Budget by trading-off some
programs to ‘fix’ others.”15
Prendergast provides a valuable overview of principal–agent game theory models that
highlight the costs and consequences of various incentive mechanisms designed to
address co-ordination and motivation issues.16 The objective of the DoD “principal” in
defense acquisitions is to obtain defense equipment, supplies, and services better, faster
and cheaper. Meanwhile, to survive, defense industry “agents” must guarantee a
market return to their shareholders (i.e. maximize profits). The challenge is to arrive at
governance structures that align the interests of both participants in the transaction for
a mutually beneficial outcome.
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A KEY CHARACTERISTIC OF TRANSACTIONS:
ASSET SPECIFICITY
The specialization that takes place in certain defense transactions creates opportunities
for enormous cost savings from productivity improvements, boosts in product perf-
ormance, and tailored delivery schedules. These gains in cost, performance and
schedules are frequently generated by investments in assets that are specific to the
transaction. A vital TCE characteristic that defines many outsourcing transactions is
the degree of asset specificity.17 Related to the notion of sunk costs, specific assets are
investments made by parties to a transaction that lose much of their value in an
alternative use. Examples include:
• Physical Asset Specificity – investments in specialized tools and equipment.
• Human Asset Specificity – investments in specialized skills, methods (defense
accounting systems), knowledge, training, etc.
• Site Specificity – investments in location (of equipment, facilities, etc.) that
economize on transportation or inventory costs.
• Dedicated Asset Specificity – investments in dedicated capacity and infrastructure
(e.g. minimum efficient scale production facilities) for a particular customer.
• Brand-Name Specificity – investments where the reputation of one party to the
transaction depends on the actions/reputation of another (as with franchises, or
public activities that represent and reflect the government).
• Temporal Specificity – investments in “critical path” or bottleneck activities that
can have enormous impacts on schedule completion costs and dates.
When specific assets are important and there are many competing suppliers bidding
for a defense contract, it may at first appear that the market is competitive. Williamson
points out that in many such transactions “the winner of the original contract acquires
a cost (or first mover) advantage (such as unique location or learning, including the
acquisition of undisclosed or proprietary technical and managerial procedures and
task-specific skills)”.18 If the buyer (DoD) becomes dependent on a winning defense
industry supplier, and that supplier makes significant investments in specific assets
(raising barriers to entry and the costs of switching to alternative suppliers), then ex-
ante competition can turn into an ex-post buyer–seller bilateral monopoly situation.
Rubin refers to this as the “fundamental transformation”.19
THE “HOLD-UP” PROBLEM
In TCE, the combination of transaction-specific investments and an absence of ex-post
competition raises the possibility of a “hold-up”. The “foot-in-the-door” strategy
adopted by some defense contractors offers an example. In that case, a low bid induces
the government to hire the contractor, but the contractor anticipates that as it works
closely with the government, and as it makes specific investments that facilitate that
relationship (e.g. human and physical asset specificity), the government will become
increasingly dependent on that contractor.20
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For instance, since R&D transactions are often complex and uncertain, the contracts
that govern those transactions are inherently incomplete. Defense developmental
projects and their later procurement are often seen as among the most challenging
acquisition endeavors, largely because of their size and technological complexity. Such
transactions are undertaken with contracts in the context of inter-firm collaboration:
where a client firm engages an outside supplier to design and/or engineer a component,
subsystem or process.21 Unique also are the performance, quality and security require-
ments, since combat environments often place products and end users at extreme risk
if there is any failure.
On the one hand, since unexpected changes in the contract often arise in the devel-
opment process, a defense company might bid low in anticipation of higher returns
from later “holding up” the government by charging excessively high prices for “change
orders” or later procurement.22 On the other hand, the government also has the power
to hold up a company that might have made significant investments in specific assets,
by threatening to “walk away” from the relationship – if demand drops due to a change
in the political or defense environment for example. Asset specificity lies at the core of
the hold-up problem, particularly in the case of complex and uncertain transactions
that lead to incomplete contracting.
If individuals, firms, or organizations cannot be assured of realizing the full value of
a transaction-specific investment through a credible commitment not to partake in
post-contractual opportunistic behavior, then efficient productivity-, schedule- or
performance-enhancing specific investments that enhance national security might not
be made. In turn, this reduces both the benefits generated by the transaction, and the
incentive for parties to engage in that transaction.
The hold-up problem arises whenever any party to a contract that involves a specific
asset worries that, after it has sunk an investment, it may be forced to accept worse
terms ex-post, or that its investment might somehow be devalued by its contracting
partner. The party that has less invested in the transaction may attempt to expropriate
some of the value of its partner’s specific investment(s) through ex-post bargaining – say
by threatening to walk away from the relationship. Thus asset specificity makes asset
owners vulnerable to “free-riding” by their contracting partners.
Consider DoD for example. While, on the one hand, the most recent Kadish report
on defense acquisition talks about the challenge of “motivating industry investments in
future technology [and] encouraging industrial investment in areas of importance to
the Department . . .”,23 on the other hand it observes that “Government cost (budget
cuts) and schedule (stretching out programs) instability has been a problem in all
system acquisitions since the Civil War.” As a consequence, transactions that require a
significant degree of specific investments normally also require contracts and gover-
nance structures that protect the investor against early termination or opportunistic
ex-post renegotiation. This added risk faced by defense contractors subject to political
and budgetary uncertainty tends to dampen their enthusiasm for defense-specific
investments.24
According to Kadish, while the “defense acquisition process . . . requires extended
planning horizons, the Department’s budgeting process is based on short-term
decision making”.25 The outcome is “government-induced instability”. The report
24-2 master new size.qxp:24-2 master new size.qxp  8/5/08  11:46  Page 113
proposes a new governance structure to mitigate this uncertainty and to add stability to
major defense acquisition programs – an “Acquisition Stabilization Account”.26
Solutions to the “hold-up” problem
The government can overcome incentives for contractors to under-invest in specific
assets – for example, to adopt labor-intensive as opposed to more efficient capital-
intensive production choices (with consequent higher prices) – by shifting the risk away
from contractors. The risk to contractors can be reduced by the government investing
in stabilization accounts, or through contractual means by introducing contingent
clauses that reward these investments through incentive contracts or promises of ter-
mination fees. Solving the asset specificity problem can also be accomplished – and the
risk to contractors shifted onto the government – simply by shifting the ownership of
strategic assets to the government. This “property rights” approach is discussed by
Grossman and Hart.27 In the recent past, for example, DoD facilities reflected govern-
ment ownership of specific assets as “Government Owned Contractor Operated”
(GOCO). Today, the DoD still sometimes employs Government Furnished Property as
consumables, information, or loaned equipment.
In the past, the government often chose to internalize the entire transaction (vertical
integration), or to make rather than buy (as in Government Owned Government
Operated – GOGO facilities). The optimum choice for DoD (Contractor Owned Con-
tractor Operated – COCO, GOCO or GOGO) ultimately depends on an evaluation of
production and transaction costs, market contestability, product performance, and
schedule and delivery options.28
ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
TCE recognizes that transactions can be organized under a spectrum of governance
structures ranging from spot markets to vertical integration. Between these two poles are
contracts of increasing duration and complexity – from fixed-price, to cost-reimbursable,
and from simple short-term contracts, to incentive, long-term, and relational contracts.29
Outsourcing involves a move away from vertical integration (make), to spot market trans-
actions or one of the intermediate or “hybrid” contracting options.30
According to Williamson, three key attributes differentiate governance structures:
incentives, administrative controls, and dispute settlement (or adaptation).31 Spot
market purchases are characterized by high-powered incentives, little administrative
control and a legalistic dispute settling mechanism. Unfortunately, while market gover-
nance provides strong, high-powered incentives for quality and cost, it offers little
protection for specific investments since buyers and sellers can easily walk away from
transactions. Thus the transaction costs of dealing with markets increase with the
potential for hold-ups. In contrast, whereas vertical integration (make) alleviates hold-
ups since dispute settlement takes place largely within the organization, it combines
low-powered incentives with extensive administrative (bureaucratic) controls.
Masten’s path-breaking econometric study based on the procurement of com-
ponents and services by a large naval shipbuilder indicates that overall organization
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costs represent about 14 percent of total costs for components and activities in the
sample.32 More importantly, “these costs vary systematically with the nature of the
transaction and . . . savings from choosing organizational arrangements selectively can
be substantial”. Interestingly, the authors find that “subcontracting work currently
performed inside . . . would, on average, generate market organization costs almost
three times those incurred managing that work internally”, and that as “the costs of
dealing across a market interface . . . rise the greater the potential for holdups in a given
transaction . . .”.33
Adopting new technology such as the internet and leveraging the falling cost of
computer and communications equipment can reduce the “costs of dealing across a
market interface”. Short of vertical integration (make), contracts, strategic alliances,
partnerships, joint ventures, etc., can be designed to provide some protection for assets
while still preserving market incentives. The challenge is that the benefits from the
transaction be divided in such a way that they induce the efficient amount of specific
investment(s) in the relationship. This involves writing a contract with enough
precision to assure desired performance, but enough flexibility to allow productive
adaptation, as circumstances require. The challenge increases the greater the degree of
asset specificity and the more complex and uncertain the transaction.34
Combined with the limitations of bounded rationality, imperfect information tends
to preclude comprehensive ex-ante contracting, making many contracts inherently
incomplete. In turn, this raises the opportunity for hold-ups and ex-post renegotiation.
In summary, TCE predicts that the higher the degree of asset specificity, the greater the
likelihood that vertical integration, longer-term contracts, and other mechanisms (rep-
utation, GOCO, etc.) will be used to promote and protect transaction-specific
investments.
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
On the whole, the empirical literature is consistent with these theoretical predictions. In
the case of vertical integration, Monteverde and Teece found that automobile com-
ponents that required greater design engineering (human asset specificity) were more
likely to be vertically integrated (or less likely to be outsourced).35 Moreover, according
to the Masten et al. study of subcontracting practices in naval construction, the proba-
bility of vertical integration increased with the temporal specificity of particular
construction activities.36 This is because any delay in these key critical path activities
would disrupt the overall completion time of the project. If outsourced (buy) instead of
vertically integrated (make), subcontractors could threaten a delay (hold-up) in
exchange for price concessions (transaction costs of re-negotiation).
Reputation is another important enforcement mechanism that can be used to
alleviate this problem, especially in the case of repeated relationships.37 “Past perfor-
mance” is often used as a criterion for subsequent contract awards, revealing that
reputation is indeed a mechanism used to encourage specific investments and avoid
hold-ups in practice.
There is evidence that longer-term contracts are also used as a mechanism to
mitigate the risk of hold-up in the case of transactions between coal mines and electric
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utilities that involve greater levels of asset specificity. Joskow examines transactions
between coal mines (sellers) and electric utilities (buyers). The study reveals two inter-
esting cases in the West – where there are few coal mines, more limited transportation,
and different grades of coal, there is a higher degree of asset specificity associated with
transactions, and greater threat of ex-post opportunism. As predicted by TCE, Joskow
reports that transactions in the West tend to be governed by longer-term contracts, and
that spot markets are virtually non-existent.38
In sharp contrast, in the eastern United States – where there are many electric
utilities and coal mines, abundant and competitive transportation, and coal is largely
homogeneous – there is a lower degree of asset specificity associated with transactions,
and consequently a smaller threat of ex-post opportunism. As predicted by TCE, Joskow
reports that transactions largely occur in spot markets governed by short-term
contracts.39
With respect to other mechanisms that can help promote and protect physical asset
specificity – such as Government Furnished Property (GFP) specific assets – Mon-
teverde and Teece found that automobile manufacturers were more likely to own the
tooling used by their suppliers, the more specialized and expensive it was.40 Moreover,
according to Klein et al., General Motors’ decision to acquire (or vertically integrate)
Fisher Body was partly influenced by the need for transaction-specific investments in
new stamping presses and dies (physical asset specificity). The Fisher Body story has,
however, become a matter of some controversy.41
Finally, an important lesson is that the government must commit not to expropriate
assets from contractors or regulated firms if it wants them to invest in transaction-
specific assets. Levy and Spiller’s international comparison of telecommunications
regulation demonstrates that only if government regulators commit not to pursue
arbitrary administrative actions that threaten the value of specific assets, will private
(specific) investment be forthcoming.42 For instance, where regulators failed to commit
not to set arbitrarily low prices, regulated firms were unwilling to make specific infra-
structure investments because they feared they might not be able to recover the value of
those investments.
OTHER TCE CHARACTERISTICS: COMPLEXITY,
UNCERTAINTY AND FREQUENCY
Besides asset specificity, transactions are also characterized by complexity and uncer-
tainty. Crocker and Masten address the impact of uncertainty on contract duration.
They find that the government’s regulation of the price of natural gas, in reducing the
ability of parties to adapt long-term contracts to reflect future uncertainty, reduced
contract lengths in the industry by an average of 14 years.43 The greater the uncertainty,
the shorter the duration of the contract.
A study by Bajari and Tadelis on construction contracts provides evidence that com-
plexity and uncertainty are sufficient to generate ex-post adaptation and renegotiation –
even in the absence of specific investments.44 It turns out that the decision to govern
construction transactions with fixed-price type contracts, as opposed to cost-
reimbursable-type contracts, is sensitive to the complexity and uncertainty in the
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transaction. A counterpart to this example exists in governance options prescribed by
the US military for outsourcing various phases in a new product’s development (see
Table 1, p. 118).
Evidence uncovered by Bajari and Tadelis reveals that, in cases where a construction
transaction is easy to define and measure, i.e. there is little complexity, and only a few
minor changes are expected, there is little uncertainty, Fixed Price (FP) contracts tend
to dominate. However, the more complex and uncertain the transaction (and the more
difficult and costly it is to define and measure performance), the more likely a change
in the contract will be required, the more severe the adversarial relationships experi-
enced ex-post when FP contracts were chosen.
In the latter case, FP-type contracts often ended in costly renegotiations where any
surplus generated in the transaction was dissipated through unproductive bargaining
and influencing activities. Thus, even in the absence of asset specificity, complexity and
uncertainty can force parties to turn to cost-reimbursable-type contracts and to rely
heavily on reputation and other enforcement mechanisms to avoid ex-post opportunis-
tic behavior that can dissipate the value generated by a transaction.
Relating these observations to military contracting for major weapon systems,
empirical evidence uncovered by Crocker and Reynolds for the manufacture of US Air
Force aircraft engines mirrors the findings in Bajari and Tadelis.45 In the initial produc-
tion stages – when modifications were expected – contracts that governed transactions
tended to be of the cost-reimbursable variety. In later production stages – after initial
problems had been ironed out – contracts tended to be of the fixed-price variety. Of
course, this kind of selection of contract type has become a matter of well-known policy.
For purposes of illustration, Table 1 summarizes prescribed contract types employed
by the US Air Force and Navy at each stage of development of a new product.46 The
Table indicates that fixed-price (cost-reimbursable) type contracts are prescribed in
later (earlier) stages of product development when complexity and uncertainty have
(have not) been resolved, and the Statement of Work (SOW) is well (not well) defined,
and that this results in relatively low (high) risks to the government. Note that while
these prescribed contracts focus on the characteristics of complexity and uncertainty,
apparently overlooked by defense policymakers is the vital role of asset specificity – one
of the key insights of TCE.
Another significant characteristic of transactions is frequency. Recurrent transactions
often justify the setup costs of specialized assets and special governance requirements.
They also offer the opportunity to apply learning curves (cumulative cost–quantity
relationships) to lower production costs, and for gradual reductions in uncertainty as
both parties learn more about costs. Recurring transactions also offer the possibility for
the accumulation of goodwill and to build reputations. The Federal Acquisition System
that governs defense acquisitions encourages screening and selection of vendors by rep-
utation and experience “using contractors who have a track record of successful past
performance”.47 In summary, TCE emphasizes four key characteristics of transactions:
asset specificity; complexity; uncertainty, and frequency.48
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SOLVING GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS THROUGH VERTICAL
INTEGRATION
When asset specificity, bounded rationality (complexity and uncertainty), and oppor-
tunism make contracting problems too difficult (or external transaction costs too
high), “the problems of incomplete contracting are often relieved by unified
ownership”.49 But when transactions occur within an organization, calculations must
also include the costs of internal co-ordination and motivation. Whereas vertical inte-
gration brings transaction-specific assets under the control of one organization and
reduces opportunism from hold-up, hierarchies cannot control costs as effectively as
markets – or suffer from “low-powered” incentives. Moreover, bounded rationality
limits the span of effective internal managerial control, so that lower-level managers
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Table 1
Stages of product development and contract types
Stages of Basic Exploratory Test and Full-scale Production Follow-on
product research development demonstration development production
development and spares
Contract
specification Not well defined (C+) Well defined (FP)
(PWS)
Contract






FP: Fixed-Price: Ex-ante negotiated contract price is not subject to any adjustment based on actual ex-post
costs of performing the contract.
FPIF: Fixed-Price Incentive Firm: Contract provides for incentive based on pre-determined share of actual
costs (profits) over (under) target costs (profits), or based on subjective measures of performance against
standards. Firm ceiling price limits overall payments.
FPEPA: Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment: Contract provides for price adjustments to reflect
exogenous cost increases/decreases.
FPPR: Fixed-Price with Prospective Re-determination: Contract provides fixed-price for first period and
timetable for re-pricing over subsequent periods.
Cost reimbursement contracts
CPFF: Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee: Contract pays allowable costs plus fixed fee (if FF=0 then same as Time and
Materials, if FF<0, then cost sharing between government and contractor).
CPIF: Cost-Plus-Incentive Fee: Contract pays allowable costs plus incentive fee based on assessments of per-
formance (such as actual costs and delivery dates, and/or more subjective measures).
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and employees often engage in multi-tasking, sub-optimizing, and unproductive rent-
seeking behavior.50
Hierarchy in a government organization like the DoD can lead to sub-optimization,
where the joint pursuit of lower-level goals fails to coincide with the global objectives of
the organization.51 This often happens in the budget planning process with internal
lobbying for resources. However, opportunism can compound the problem by intro-
ducing strategic efforts to gain local advantage at the expense of the larger group.
Sub-optimization can thus expand to include the strategic use of asymmetric informa-
tion for local benefit. As a consequence, while government in-sourcing can reduce
ex-post opportunism due to hold-up, the tradeoff includes: low-powered incentives,
internal opportunistic behavior, and an increase in administrative costs.52
When ex-ante competition among suppliers is transformed into an ex-post bilaterally
dependent relationship, additional governance structures are required to induce co-
operative adaptation.53 These structures can include anything from agreements to share
and verify cost and performance information in incentive contracts, to the careful
crafting of dispute settlement mechanisms. However, such agreements often increase
external transaction costs. The higher the external transaction costs, the larger the pro-
duction cost savings need to be to support the decision to continue a defense acquisition.
CONCLUSION
An underlying objective of TCE is to contribute to the design of contracts, organiza-
tions, and other governance structures to reduce transaction costs and improve the
gains from defense acquisitions. TCE suggests that the degree of completeness of
the statement of work (SOW) describing the acquisition, and the completeness of the
contract itself, is an optimizing decision by both parties that reflects their trade-offs
between an ex-ante investment in the SOW and contract design, and the potential ex-
post cost of opportunistic renegotiation. Moreover, since the principal insight of TCE is
that the choice of optimal governance structure depends on the characteristics of the
transaction, the dual focus of defense acquisition management officials should be: first,
to sort transactions into categories based on their principal characteristics (asset speci-
ficity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency); and second, to evaluate the costs and
consequences of alternative contracts, organizational structures and mechanisms
available to govern those transactions.54
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, the easier it is to write an
explicit contract that covers all relevant contingencies. Moreover, the lower the admin-
istrative and enforcement costs of that contract, the lower the expected return from
ex-post bargaining, and thus the lower the transaction costs. These favorable character-
istics tend to encourage greater productive effort that in turn contributes to bigger
benefits enjoyed by both parties to the transaction.
In contrast, in the case of complex transactions and uncertain outcomes, “bounded
rationality” precludes comprehensive ex-ante contracting (contracts are inherently
incomplete) which raises the possibility of gains from (unproductive) ex-post oppor-
tunistic bargaining and renegotiation (e.g. the “hold-up” problem). When ex-ante
competition among suppliers is transformed into an ex-post bilaterally dependent rela-
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tionship, additional governance structures may be required to induce co-operative
adaptation. The challenge is to write a contract with enough precision to encourage
desired performance, but enough flexibility to allow productive adaptation (adjust-
ments), as circumstances require.
Contracting offers an imperfect solution to opportunism unless certain variables are
incorporated. What is required are additional governance mechanisms (rules and
regulations, reputation mechanisms, Government Furnished Property, etc.) to settle
disputes and adapt to new conditions, and ex-ante efforts to screen for reliability and
reputation or to safeguard and protect transaction-specific investments. These struc-
tures can include anything from agreements to share and verify cost and performance
information through incentive contracts, to the careful crafting of dispute settlement
mechanisms. TCE can help defense managers recognize key characteristics of trans-
actions that can guide them to choose an appropriate contract type and governance
mechanism to improve outcomes in terms of performance, cost and schedule.
The goal of this article was to integrate and apply key principles of TCE that previ-
ously focused on the firm, to government outsourcing. TCE recognizes that
organizations enter into bilateral contracts with suppliers, workers, managers,
customers, firms, and other organizations that require costly governance (co-ordina-
tion and incentive) mechanisms.
TCE assumes that economic actors – say Defense Program Managers “principals”
and defense industry “agents” in an outsourcing relationship – are motivated to look
ahead, recognize potential hazards, and factor these into contracts or organizational
design. Due to the problem of “bounded rationality” first introduced by Nobel Prize
winner Herb Simon, their capacity to do so is limited.55 Rubin puts it somewhat differ-
ently: “. . . it is impossible to write a [complete] contract to protect a firm’s interests in
a situation of complex contracting”.56
While parties to a transaction may jointly benefit from co-operation, they will not
necessarily have incentives to live up to the terms of an incomplete contract and cannot
expect others to do so.57 The challenge is to design contracts, incentive schemes, mon-
itoring and enforcement mechanisms, and to adopt other governance arrangements
(property rights, reputation, bonding, warranties, etc.), that allow for credible commit-
ments ex-ante and that promote mutual compliance ex-post.58
Comparing the two bodies of knowledge (TCE theory with DoD acquisition
practice) leads to some interesting insights. First, even though originally intended to
study the “make-or-buy” decision, TCE offers useful insights for program managers
strictly involved with the “buy” option. TCE highlights problems that can, and do, arise
in outsourcing relationships, and provides useful indicators regarding their severity
(i.e., the expected “transactions costs”). While the main body of TCE casts light on
“make-or-buy” (vertical integration) issues, it also provides powerful insights into the
effective management of outsourcing relationships. Defense program managers need to
anticipate issues that pertain to governing outsourcing relationships with the same
vigilance with which they anticipate risks – with a view to managing and mitigating both
sets of problems.
Defense contracting practice could be significantly improved by viewing defense
transactions through the lens of TCE. An important insight is the opportunity to craft
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contracts based on the potential for opportunistic behavior, in addition to varying
incentives based on shifting risk. Where there is significant scope for opportunistic
behavior, contracts should pay special attention to the use of additional mechanisms to
govern the outsourcing relationship. This suggests that existing guidance on contract
types should be extensively revisited – an important first step in translating the theoret-
ical insights of TCE into DoD practice.
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1. In this study, the term “outsourcing” is used to encompass any situation that involves a gov-
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federal level.
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8. Today, businesses tend to restrict production to their core competencies and acquire the
other parts of their products from outside suppliers. For example, one might expect an auto-
mobile manufacturer to accomplish the final assembly of the cars it sells, but acquire tyres
from outside companies. Less obvious is the case of a windshield, see R. Coase, op. cit.
9. To use a physical analog, the market is not a frictionless medium. Operations in the market-
place require expenditure of time, resources and management attention.
10. At the beginning of FY 2000, the size of the DoD’s total acquisition workforce was estimated
to be 124,000 personnel. See, DoD, Annual Defense Report (ADR),Washington DC: Depart-
ment of Defense, 2000.
11. Grossman and Hart, and Hart and Moore address the issue of incomplete contracting,
where bargaining problems can constrain efficient production. They demonstrate how
selective ownership of assets or property rights can alleviate many incentive and bargaining
concerns. S. Grossman and O. Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Lateral and Vertical Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, 1986, pp. 691–719; O.
Hart and J. Moore, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 98, 1989, pp. 1119–1158. However, Tirole argues that governance mecha-
nisms can be designed to handle unverifiable contract terms (where contracting parties may
be able to observe certain variables unverifiable by a third party), returning the problem to
one of complete contracting in the principal-agent tradition. J. Tirole, The Theory of Indus-
trial Organization, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. Here we take a broader-brush, stylized
bargaining game approach in the spirit of incomplete contracting. This approach is more
closely aligned with the governance branch of TCE where the main focus is on ex-post adap-
tation under incomplete contracting. See, O. Williamson and S. Masten, The Economics of
Transaction Costs, Northampton, Mass.: Elger, 1999.
12. R. Coase, op. cit., p. 392.
13. O. Williamson and S. Masten, op. cit., 1999.
14. Kadish et al., Defense Acquisition Performance Report, Washington DC: US Department of
Defense, January 2006, p. 1.
15. Ibid., p. 7.
16. An important distinction is made in the literature between complete and incomplete
contract theory. Under complete contracting all payments and actions can be specified ex-
ante. In contrast, under incomplete contracting (due to information costs, bounded
rationality, asset specificity, etc.) some contingencies are left out of contracts, or if included
might not be enforceable. Thus, some actions and payments will have to be determined ex-
post, through adaptation and renegotiation. Complete contracting theory has developed
through principal-agent models such as those reviewed in C. Prendergast, “The Provision of
Incentives in Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.37/1, 1999, pp. 7–62.
17. A crude measure of the degree of asset specificity is to take the cost of the initial investment
and subtract any depreciation (physical wear and tear and obsolescence) and the salvage (or
current market) value.
18. O. Williamson, op. cit., 1999, p. 27.
19. Several demonstrative cases come to the minds of the authors, such as the Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS) development contract being awarded to the developer of the
vehicle platform. And innumerable production contracts have similarly been awarded to
prime system developers. However, one way to address the hold-up concern is with the
strategic use of production options in a developmental project. Such was the case when in
1990, LTV Corporation had responded to the Army with “not-to-exceed” missile produc-
tion costs as part of their proposal for a fixed-price development contract for missile and
launcher integration. The options proposed had an expiration date. So the government was
persuaded to fund the program and accomplish program decisions before expiration, while
the contractor was motivated to seek cost savings in order to maximize profits under an
eventual production scenario. The options were in fact exercised with only a few days to
spare, and just in time to produce missiles employed during the first Gulf War. P. Rubin,
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Managing Business Transactions: Controlling the Cost of Coordinating, Communicating, and
Decision Making, New York: Free Press, 1990.
20. The DoD has long acknowledged the dangers of becoming “locked in” to propriety technol-
ogy (or unique expertise, i.e. human asset specificity). See DoD Guidebook, 2006.
Interestingly, we observe much less of this cautionary language today, possibly because of
highly inelastic demand due to wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, or perhaps because the
potential for “hold-up” is simply being overlooked.
21. S. J. Carson, A. Madhok, R. Varman and G. John, “Information Processing: Moderators of
the Effectiveness of Trust-based Governance in Interfirm R&D Collaboration”, Organiza-
tion Science, Vol. 14, 2003, pp. 45–56.
22. Demsetz, Stigler and Posner suggest repeated bidding as a means to prevent ex-post oppor-
tunism in the case of government outsourcing a (regulated) natural monopoly. See,
H. Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 11, 1968,
pp. 55–66; G. Stigler, The Organization of Industry, Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1968; R. Posner,
“The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry”, Bell Journal of
Economics, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 98–129. However, Williamson emphasizes that switching costs –
related to specific investments – pose a hazard associated with governmental use of repeated
bidding to outsource a natural monopoly. Once two parties have traded, switching costs may
increase due to specific training/experience and other investments in transaction-specific
assets, such that staying together can yield a surplus relative to trading with other parties. O.
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press, 1985, Chapter 13.
23. Kadish et al., op. cit., p. 14.
24. For example, Air Force sources indicate that, in early production stages, faced with uncer-
tainty about the ultimate production run of the F-16, General Dynamics refused to make
specific investments in the tooling and equipment required to automate riveting to reduce
costs. As a result, the wings of these high-tech aircraft were initially riveted by hand.
25. Kadish et al., op. cit., p. 6.
26. Another example comes from an author’s experience in the Javelin anti-tank missile
program, wherein the procurement objective was halved as the product entered production.
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